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1 
NOT-SO-OPEN ACCESS TO LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: 
BALANCING STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS WITH COPYRIGHT 
PRINCIPLES 
 
By Christopher J. Ryan, Jr.* 
 
Cite as: Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., Not-So-Open Access to Legal 
Scholarship: Balancing Stakeholder Interests with Copyright Principles, 
20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i1/article1.pdf.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A.  Recent Developments in the Case for Open Access to 
Scholarly Research 
 
[1] Last February, John P. Holdren, director of the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, issued a new policy designed to 
increase open access to federally-financed research.1  The memorandum, 
covering federal agencies with annual expenditures in excess of $100 
million for scientific research and development, requires, inter alia, that: 
(1) agencies develop “clear and coordinated policies” to make federally-
funded studies freely available to the public within one year of publication,                                                         
*CJ Ryan received an A.B. from Dartmouth College, a M.Ed. degree from the University 
of Notre Dame, and a J.D. degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law, 
where he was Notes Editor on Volume 101 of the KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.  In July 
2012, Kentucky Governor Steven L. Beshear appointed CJ to serve a one-year term on 
the Kentucky Council on Postsecondary Education, the Commonwealth’s higher 
education policy and regulation board.  CJ would like to thank Professor Brian L. Frye, of 
the University of Kentucky College of Law, for his contributions to this article. 
 
1 See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Director, Exec. Office of the President, Office 
of Sci. and Tech. Policy, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies 1 (Feb. 22, 2013), 
available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ostp_public_access_memo
_2013.pdf. 
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and (2) researchers account for and manage the digital data resulting from 
federally-funded scientific research.2  In addition, the policy requires data 
from publicly-funded research to be stored for “long-term preservation 
and [be] publicly accessible to search, retrieve, and analyze in ways that 
maximize the impact and accountability of the Federal research 
investment.”3  The policy also encourages agencies to collaborate with 
each other as well as with private entities to accomplish these important 
goals.4  
 
[2] This new policy marks an important step toward open access and 
appears to have satisfied both publishers and most open access advocates.5  
The policy’s purpose is clear: it rests upon the proposition that citizens 
deserve easy access to the results of scientific research funded by their tax 
dollars.6  The Office of Science and Technology Policy has examined the                                                         
2 See id. at 1-6. 
 
3 Id. at 3. 
 
4 See id. at 4. 
 
5 Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition (SPARC), a leader in the open 
access movement, and the Association of Research Libraries “celebrated the news, 
calling the new policy ‘historic.’ . . . [T]he Association of American Publishers, which 
has often clashed with open-access advocates. . . . issued a statement calling the policy a 
‘reasonable, balanced resolution.’”  Jennifer Howard, Activists and Publishers Cheer 
Policy on Open Access but Look to Next Battle, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 8, 2013, at 
A6; see The Fair Access to Science and Technology Research Act (FASTR), AM. LIBR. 
ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/access/legislation/fastr (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
For more information on SPARC, such as its Author Addendum and discussion of author 
rights, see SPARC Author Addendum to Publication Agreement, SPARC, www.sparc.arl.org/resources/authors/addendum-2007 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  
 
6 See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 1 (“The Administration is 
committed to ensuring that, to the greatest extent and with the fewest constraints possible 
and consistent with law and the objectives set out below, the direct results of federally 
funded scientific research are made available to and useful for the public, industry, and 
the scientific community.” ). 
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issue at length by soliciting stakeholder input and convening an 
interagency work-group to develop a policy that would balance these often 
divergent interests.7  Among the stakeholders considered were “scientists 
and scientific organizations, publishers, members of Congress, and other 
members of the public,” all of whom recognize the importance of meeting 
the demand for expanded access to the results of publicly-funded 
research.8  
 
[3] The policy inspired congressional interest, resulting in the Fair 
Access to Science and Technology Research Act of 2013—bipartisan 
companion bills in the House and Senate.  The companion bills’ aim is to 
make having the results of federally-financed research publicly available 
within six months of publication the law of the land rather than the 
precedent of one presidential administration.9  Between the policy and the 
legislation, the timelines for open access after publication differ by six 
months.10  That said, the functional effect of the policy and legislation is                                                         
7 Michael Stebbins, Expanding Public Access to the Results of Federally Funded 
Research, OFF. SCI. & TECH. POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2013, 12:04 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/22/expanding-public-access-results-federally-
funded-research.  
 
8 Id.  To wit, “over [sixty-five] thousand of [these stakeholders] recently signed a We the 
People petition asking for expanded public access to the results of taxpayer-funded 
research.”  Id. 
 
9 See Howard, supra note 5, at A6; see also Fair Access to Science and Technology 
Research Act of 2013, H.R. 708, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Fair Access to Science 
and Technology Research Act of 2013, S. 350, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).  It should be 
noted that presenting companion bills—of any kind—in the House and Senate with 
bipartisan support in the 113th Congress is no small feat.  
 
10 Compare Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 3 (“[E]ach agency plan 
shall . . . use a twelve-month post-publication embargo period as a guideline for making 
research papers publicly available . . . .”), with Fair Access to Science and Technology 
Research Act of 2013, H.R. 708, 113th Cong. § 4(b)(4) (1st Sess. 2013), and Fair Access 
to Science and Technology Research Act of 2013, S. 350, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) 
(“Each Federal research public access policy shall provide for . . . free online public 
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identical: providing a temporal window in which publishers and 
researchers may capture the value of the publication of new studies while 
also allowing for public use once these economic interests have been 
realized. 
 
[4] Though both the policy and legislation explicitly cover scientific 
data, research, and journal articles, each course of action also has the 
potential to impact scholarship broadly, including federal agencies in the 
humanities and social sciences.11  Moreover, both documents specifically 
contemplate the significance of public digital access to all academic 
scholarship, without simply confining its importance to the sciences. 12  
Also, anticipating the end result of recent digital publication trends, both 
the policy and legislation underscore the effectiveness of digital 
documentation as a superior medium for storing, archiving, and 
transmitting data, while acknowledging the limitations of paper as a 
medium for the same purposes.13                                                                                                                                            
access to such final peer-reviewed manuscripts or published versions as soon as 
practicable, but not later than [six] months after publication in peer-reviewed journals.”). 
11 See Howard, supra note 5, at A6 (noting that the policy may impact agencies such as 
the Smithsonian Institution or the National Endowment for the Humanities).   
 
12 See generally H.R. 708; S. 350; Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 
1. 
 
13 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Crowdsourcing and Open Access: Collaborative 
Techniques for Disseminating Legal Materials and Scholarship, 26 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 591, 592 (2010) (“A wealth of knowledge, including legal 
knowledge, remains effectively trapped inside paper records, where it can be used only 
by those with access to the physical medium in which it is contained.  The movement to 
digitize paper records and make them freely available online promises to liberate 
information, including legal information, from these physical constraints and make it 
accessible around the globe.”).  For example, the Library of Congress has undertaken the 
digitizing of historical American documents and source texts for its American Memory 
Project.  See id. at 606 n.69.  In addition, the Google Books project, which aimed to 
increase open access to scholarship, was the recent subject of copyright litigation.  See 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying 
Google’s settlement agreement with plaintiff authors and publishers who alleged 
copyright infringement of digitally copied books and writings without authorization).  
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[5] The policy and the legislation correspond to a rising wave of broad 
interest in digital access to all scholarship, not simply federally-funded, 
scientific scholarship.  It is conceivable, then, that this regime may have 
opened the door to requiring open access in all academic scholarship, 
regardless of discipline—particularly considering that the federal 
government awards more than $40 billion each year to American 
universities for research purposes.14  Should the legislation or a similar 
statute pass into law, it would necessitate clear guidance for all academic                                                                                                                                           
However, with vast reserves of knowledge in print, the trouble with digitizing extant 
scholarship is the enormity of the task; even the most organized and well-funded efforts 
simply cannot make appreciable progress in this regard.  In fact, the Library of Congress 
estimated that, at its current pace, it would take “almost two thousand years to digitize 
the nine billion text records it presently holds in its collection.”  Armstrong, supra at 592-
93.; see Katie Hafner, History, Digitized (and Abridged), N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/10/business/yourmoney/11archive.html?pagewanted=a
ll&_r=0.  But see Stacey Patton, Group Advocates Option of Longer Embargoes on 
Digital Dissertations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2, 2013, at A9 (“The American 
Historical Association has published a new policy statement that ‘strongly encourages’ 
graduate programs and university libraries to allow new Ph.D.’s to extend embargoes on 
their dissertations in digital form for as many as six years.  The association says its stance 
seeks to balance the competing ideals of the profession: timely dissemination of new 
historical knowledge and the ability of young historians to choose when to release their 
research without jeopardizing a future publishing contract or tenure. . . . ‘History has 
been and remains a book-based discipline,’ the statement says, ‘and the requirement that 
dissertations be published online poses a tangible threat to the interest and careers of 
junior scholars in particular.’”). 
 
14 See H.R. 708; S. 350; Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 3-6; see 
also CHRISTINE M. MATTHEWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41895, FEDERAL SUPPORT 
FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH 9 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41895.pdf; 24/7 Wall St., 10 Universities that Receive 
the Most Government Money, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2013, 3:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/27/universities-government-money_n_3165186.html.  See generally  JOHN V. LOMBARDI, ET AL., CTR. FOR 
MEASURING U. PERFORMANCE, THE TOP AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT (2011), available at http://mup.asu.edu/research2011.pdf (analyzing 
research expenditures and different standards of achievement for universities throughout 
the United States). 
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scholarship, carefully balancing publishers’ interests with those of authors, 
institutions, and the public. 
 
B.  The Open Access Movement and the Internet 
 
[6] The Open Access Movement promotes robust public digital access, 
via the Internet, to peer-reviewed scholarly work—usually free of 
charge. 15   The low cost of digitally publishing and disseminating 
scholarship, when compared with the average cost of publishing 
scholarship in print, has been a significant boon to the argument for open 
access.16  Additionally, Open Access Movement advocates point to the 
practicality of the Internet as a more convenient, if not increasingly more 
popular, source for publishing, disseminating, and accessing scholarly 
work. 17   After all, the expediency of immediately downloading 
scholarship free of charge from a centralized digital repository—not to                                                         
15 See Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, EARLHAM COLL., 
http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) 
[hereinafter Open Access Overview].  This is particularly the case with a flavor of open 
access known as “gratis open access.”  See Peter Suber, Gratis and Libre Open Access, 
SPARC, http://www.sparc.arl.org/resource/gratis-and-libre-open-access (last visited Nov. 
8, 2013);see also Sean Burns, et al., Lecture for the University of Kentucky Open Access 
Week, #Altmetrics: Demystifying the Link between Research Impact and Social Media 
(Oct. 22, 2013) (supporting the use of scholarly blogs and gratis open-access publications 
for consideration by tenure committees in academic portfolios)).  For a strong 
explanation and apology of the Open Access Movement by the former national president 
of the Association of University Professors, see Cary Nelson, Open Access and Academic 
Freedom, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/11/15/essay-impact-open-access-
requirements-academic-freedom. 
 
16 See Open Access Overview, supra note 15. Primarily, the two vehicles for delivering 
open access to research articles to the public are open-access journals and open-access 
archives or repositories.  See id.; see also Burns, et al., supra note 15. 
 
17 See Robinson Meyer, How Open-Access Scholarship Improves the Internet, ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 5, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/how-
open-access-scholarship-improves-the-internet/278371/. 
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mention from the convenience of the reader’s computer, tablet, or smart 
phone—objectively trumps traveling to a research library to perform a 
lengthy search for the desired scholarly article.18 
 
[7] But the Open Access Movement, which has itself benefitted 
greatly from the rise of Internet, also benefits the average user across a 
multitude of digital media platforms. 19  This is because public digital 
access to scholarship makes the public’s vast storehouse of 
“knowledge”—Wikipedia, which, importantly, services the search 
functions for much of Apple’s Siri and Google—more reliable. 20  
Although secondary and tertiary source sites and programs currently 
underutilize existing digital scholarly repositories,21 there is “a potential 
symbiosis between Wikipedia and academic research in institutional 
repositories,” 22  because as open-access repositories become more 
comprehensive, they ensure that the highest caliber of research becomes 
the primary source for online bloggers, editors, and even the casual Siri 
query.23 
                                                         
18 See id.  
 
19 See id.  
 
20 See id.; see, e.g., Frederic Lardinois, Apple Updates Siri with Twitter, Wikipedia, Bing 
Integration, New Commands and Male and Female Voices, TECH CRUNCH (June 10, 
2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/10/apple-updates-siri-with-twitter-wikipedia-bing-
integration-new-commands-and-male-and-female-voice/. 
 
21 For example, Wikipedia cites to less than one percent of any digital repository’s 
articles.  See Meyer, supra note 17; see also Alistair G. Smith, Wikipedia and 
Institutional Repositories: An Academic Symbiosis?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISSI 2011 
CONFERENCE: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR 
SCIENTOMETRICS & INFORMETRICS 794, 797 (2011), available at 
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/staff/alastair_smith/publns/SmithAG2011_ISSI_paper.pdf. 
 
22 Smith, supra note 21, at 800. 
 
23 See Meyer, supra note 17. 
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[8] At its core, open access, particularly public access to scholarly 
research, is grounded in considerations of transparency, accountability, 
democratic legitimacy, and the fulfillment of perhaps the most 
fundamental function of academia—providing educational service for the 
public.24  This Article seeks to address the varied stakeholder interests in 
academic scholarship—specifically legal scholarship.  In Part II, this 
Article presents a current picture of legal academe and explains the 
process by which academic scholarship is accessed.  Part III explores the 
scholarship incentive scheme and evolution of policy and case law 
defining copyright and ownership interests in scholarship, and applies 
these principles to the modern employment relationship between faculty 
member and university.  In Part IV, this Article addresses concerns that an 
author’s interests are hampered by the university’s ownership of 
copyrighted works and discusses the economic and social implications of 
open access to legal scholarship.  Finally, Part V endeavors to recommend 
considerations for model policy impacting open access to scholarship. 
 
II.  ACADEMIC SCHOLARSHIP TODAY 
 
A.  A Snapshot of the Current State of Legal Academe 
 
[9] When U.S. News & World Report began publishing law school 
rankings in 1987,25 a new era of insularity, competition for new students, 
and fixation on standings relative to peer institutions took hold of legal 
                                                        
24 See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 593, 597. 
 
25 Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the 
Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX L. REV. 1483, 1510 (2004).  For a concise history of the U.S. 
News & World Report law school rankings, see id. at 1509-11.  At the time of this 
article’s publication, the most recent U.S. News law school rankings are available at 
USnews.com.  Best Law School Rankings 2014, US NEWS, http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-
rankings (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
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academe.26  Pierced by a combination of “U.S. News-driven ranking mania, 
law schools’ insatiable hunger for growth, and huge law firms’ obsession 
with profit above all else,” the bubble burst.27  In January 2013, the Law 
School Admission Council reported that law school admission 
applications were headed for a thirty-year low, in part, because of 
“increased concern over soaring tuition, crushing student debt, and 
diminishing prospects of lucrative employment upon graduation.”28  The                                                         
26 See Steven J. Harper, Pop Goes the Law, CHRON. REV., Mar. 15, 2013, at B6-B7 
(blaming “the bursting of the law bubble” on, among other things, “decades of greed and 
grandiosity[,] . . . the profession’s darker side, including the recession’s exacerbation of 
the attorney glut, . . . [and the fact that] law schools and the American Bar Association [] 
abdicated their responsibilities in . . . an effort to satisfy the mindless criteria underlying 
law-school rankings, especially U.S. News & World Report’s annual list”).  In reality, the 
decline in law schools is more nuanced, but is inextricably tied to the decline of the 
economy during the Great Recession and the resulting decline in demand for law jobs.   
 
27 Id. at B6; see Ronald G. Ehrenberg, American Law Schools in a Time of Transition, 63 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 98, 98 (2013) (“The economic model for law schools is breaking down 
because of the collapse of the job market for new lawyers, making it difficult to justify 
ever increasing tuition levels.”); Genevieve Blake Tung, Academic Law Libraries and the 
Crisis in Legal Education, 105 L. LIBR. J. 275, 275 (2013); Ethan Bronner, Law School 
Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/law-schools-applications-fall-as-costs-
rise-and-jobs-are-cut.html?_r=0 (“‘We are going through a revolution in law with a time 
bomb on our admissions books,’ said William D. Henderson, a professor of law at 
Indiana University, who has written extensively on the issue.  ‘Thirty years ago if you 
were looking to get on the escalator to upward mobility, you went to business or law 
school.  Today, the law school escalator is broken.’”). 
 
28 Bronner, supra note 27; see also Staci Zaretsky, Law School Applications Plummet, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 20, 2013, 11:08 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/law-school-applications-continue-to-tumble/.  This could well be a response to the bleak 
marketplace for full time, permanent attorney jobs available to recent law graduates.  See 
Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL STREET J. (June 25, 2012, 
10:18 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577486623469958142. Worse yet for the future of the legal profession, significantly less “qualified” 
prospective law school applicants sat for the LSAT in 2012 than did in 2011, suggesting 
that the wrong students—the top performers—have written off their plan to pursue a law 
degree. See Jordan Weissmann, The Wrong People Have Stopped Applying to Law 
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number of law school applicants this year—54,000—is nearly half of what 
it was in 2004.29 
 
[10] As the volume of law school applications rose in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century, universities increasingly treated their law schools as 
profit centers: while data from private law schools is virtually inaccessible, 
a 2010 report from the University of Baltimore School of Law 
corroborates a widely held view that universities appropriate between 
twenty and twenty-five percent of their law schools’ gross revenues.30  
Dwindling applications and enrollment in the last few months has 
prompted law schools to layoff and buyout valuable employees.31  Many                                                                                                                                           
School, ATLANTIC (April 10, 2012, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/the-wrong-people-have-stopped-
applying-to-law-school/255685/. 
 
29 See id.; see also Harper, supra note 26, at B6. 
 
30 See Harper, supra note 26, at B7.  Perhaps, for this very reason, a respected two-year 
law degree—or at least an optional third year—is a pipe dream.  See Matt Barnum, The 
Two-Year Law Degree: A Great Idea That Will Never Come to Be, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 
2013, 8:53 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/11/the-two-year-
law-degree-a-great-idea-that-will-never-come-to-be/281341/. 
 
31 See, e.g., David Lat, A Law School’s Possible Purge of Its Junior Faculty Ranks, 
ABOVE THE LAW (July 1, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/a-law-
schools-possible-purge-of-its-junior-faculty-ranks/; Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Massive 
Layoffs’ Predicted in Law Schools Due to Big Drop in Applicants, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 31, 
2013, 6:37 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/massive_layoffs_predicted_in_law_schools_due
_to_big_drop_in_applicants; Jon Wolper, Vermont Law School Gives Buyouts to Ten 
Workers, VALLEY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.vnews.com/news/3896880-
95/buyouts-laid-law-members; Staci Zaretsky, Much-Maligned Law School Conducts 
Faculty and Staff Layoffs, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 16, 2013, 12:09 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/much-maligned-law-school-conducts-faculty-and-staff-
layoffs/ (referencing extensive layoffs at Thomas Jefferson School of Law).  See 
generally Erin Fuchs, The Law School Crisis Could Crush ‘Stand-Alone’ Schools, BUS. 
INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2013, 5:33 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/which-law-schools-
might-fail-2013-1. 
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have attacked the U.S. News methodology for compiling its law school 
rankings as a source of fuel for the conflagration that has engulfed legal 
education in recent months,32 even suggesting that faculty production of 
scholarship is so vital to legal academe that SSRN output should be the 
measure of a law school’s faculty. 33   Whatever the cause of these                                                         
32 Professor Harper argues that “[f]lawed methodology infects each category—quality 
assessment, selectively, placement, and resources.”  Harper, supra note 26, at B7.  For 
example,  
[q]uality assessment is the biggest contributor to a law school’s U.S. 
News ranking, accounting for [forty] percent of its total score.  The 
category itself is a misnomer because it doesn’t reflect quality at all.  
Rather, using statistically suspect samples of scholars and practicing 
lawyers, it’s a superficial and unreliable assessment of a school’s 
reputation. 
Id.  At the same time, Professors Black and Caron recognize that  
legal scholars can neither cede to a news magazine the task of 
measuring our performance, nor pretend that the U.S. News rankings do 
not matter, nor simply complain about their weaknesses and hope they 
will improve over time.  Instead, we need to produce our own measures 
that capture attributes that U.S. News misses.   
Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure 
Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L.J. 83, 84 (2006).  For a discussion of U.S. News’ 
rankings methodology, see Sam Flanigan & Robert Morse, Methodology: Best Law 
School Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/articles/2013/03/11/methodology-best-law-schools-rankings. 
 
33 See Black & Caron, supra note 32, at 84-85 (“The methods for ranking the scholarly 
performance of law faculties include reputation surveys . . .[,] publication counts . . .[,] 
and citation counts . . . .  Each offers a useful but partial picture of faculty performance.  
Our modest claim is that SSRN-based measures can offer a different, also useful, albeit 
also partial, picture that has its own set of limits and biases, but at the same time can 
address some of the deficiencies in other measures.”).  See generally Richard A. Danner 
et al., The Durham Statement Two Years Later: Open Access in the Law School Journal 
Environment, 103 LAW LIBR. J. 39 (2011), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2988&context=faculty_schol
arship; James M. Donovan & Carol A. Watson, Citation Advantage of Open Access Legal 
Scholarship, 103 LAW LIBR. J. 553 (2011), available at 
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problems, the landscape of legal academe—a historically immutable 
field34—is incontrovertibly changed and must adapt to the modern market 
to reestablish its relevancy.  Doing so requires reclaiming the primary 
public functions of legal academe: (1) keeping up with the needs of the 
profession and the public, 35  and (2) educating the profession and the 
public on legal affairs.36 
 
B.  Access to Legal Scholarship 
 
[11] Academic scholarship is subject to the practices of the proprietary 
publishing industry, which, for both academicians and universities, places 
certain restrictions on scholarship: from access policies and subscription 
fees to the copyright assignment requirement of several scholarly                                                                                                                                           
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=law_lib_a
rtchop. 
 
34 See, e.g., LAURENCE A. WEINSTEIN, MOVING A BATTLESHIP WITH YOUR BARE HANDS: 
GOVERNING A UNIVERSITY SYSTEM 4, 6 (1993) (comparing, hyperbolically, effecting 
change in academic institutions to “moving a battleship with your bare hands”); Neil R. 
Kestner, The Changing Landscape of Academics as Affected by New Communications 
Technology, in THE TRANSITION FROM PAPER: WHERE ARE WE GOING AND HOW WILL 
WE GET THERE? (R. Stephen Berry & Anne Simon Moffat eds., 2001), available at 
https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=562.  As an aside, I 
would like to include a paraphrased joke told to me by a former-state-supreme-court-
justice-turned-law-school dean, who shall remain nameless: “If you took an architecture 
professor from fifty years ago and placed him in an architecture classroom today, he 
wouldn’t have the foggiest idea where he is.  However, if you took a law professor from 
the last century and put him at the front of a classroom today, he would be right at home 
lecturing on Palsgraf.” 
 
35 See Bronner, supra note 27. 
 
36 “[E]xploring whether data about papers posted on the Social Science Research 
Network (SSRN) can supplement existing methods for ranking law school faculties,” 
Professors Black and Caron believe that the result will inure to the benefit of the public as 
well as create a more transparent and objective picture of legal academe.  Black & Caron, 
supra note 32, at 84-85. 
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journals. 37  In the last decade, university libraries have been forced to 
choose between purchasing monographs and journal subscriptions, or 
undergoing complete deaccession of non-essential materials; in contrast, 
the proprietary publishing industry has continued to enjoy considerable 
profit margins.38  This is not to say the proprietary publishing industry is 
the villain in this story; it does, however, account for publishing the lion’s 
share of academic scholarship to the exclusion of resources that promote 
open access.39 
 
[12] The publication of American legal scholarship, on the other hand, 
follows somewhat of a different model from that of the other academic 
disciplines; it is lacking in many of the complications that are 
commonplace in, for example, publishing scientific scholarship.40  While                                                         
37 Especially given that articles are submitted and peer-reviewed virtually free of charge 
to scholarly journals, these practices lack justification and “seem fundamentally unfair.”  
Alissa Centivany, Paper Tigers: Rethinking the Relationship Between Copyright and 
Scholarly Publishing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 385, 385-86 (2011), 
available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseventeen/centivany.pdf; see also Columbia 
University Senate Endorses Resolution on Open Access and Scholarly Communication, 
COLUM. U. LIBR./INFO. SERVICES (Apr. 4, 2005), 
http://library.columbia.edu/news/libraries/2005/20050421_open_access.html 
(“[T]echnological, legal[,] and economic barriers continue to be erected to obstruct . . . 
open access  . . . .”); Jennifer Howard, U. of California Tries Just Saying No to Rising 
Journal Costs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 8, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/U-of-
California-Tries-Just/65823/. 
 
38 See Centivany, supra note 37, at 386; Karla Hahn, ALR Statement to Scholarly 
Publishers on the Global Economic Crisis, RES. LIBR. ISSUES, Feb. 2009, at 6, 6-11, 
available at http://publications.arl.org/n8218.pdf ; MLA Ad Hoc Comm. on Future of 
Scholarly Publ’g, The Future of Scholarly Publishing, in PROFESSION 2002, at 172, 172-
75 (Phyllis Franklin ed. 2002). 
 
39 See Centivany, supra note 37, at 411-12. 
 
40 See Jessica Litman, The Economics of Open Access Law Publishing, 10 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 779, 782-83 (2006), available at http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/9593-
lcb104litmanpdf. 
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commercial law journals, 41 learned law society journals, 42 refereed law 
journals,43 and peer-reviewed law journals44 do exist, their market share is 
overshadowed by law journals published by or affiliated with American 
law schools.45  Outside grants rarely fund the production of legal research; 
in many ways legal publishing already employs open access funding 
initiatives, similar to how universities encourage open access publishing of 
scholarship from the other academic disciplines, such as underwriting the 
“author pays” approach to open-access publishing, 46  and instituting                                                         
41 A number of proprietary legal publishers operate commercial journals, such as 
Thomson West’s Intellectual Property Law Review.  See generally Intellectual Property 
Law Review, LEGAL SOLUTIONS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-
products/Law-Reviews-and-Journals/Intellectual-Property-Law-Review/p/100027780 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2013).  Since the days of the early republic, commercial publishing 
of legal scholarship was a dubious business prospect. For an intriguing history of legal 
scholarship publication in America, see Ross E. Davies, The Original Law Journals, 12 
GREEN BAG 2D 187, 187-90 (2009). 
 
42 For example, the American Bar Association, the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. and 
the American Intellectual Property Association also operate their own journals.  See 
generally ABA JOURNAL, http://www.abajournal.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2013); 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A., http://www.csusa.org/?page=Journal (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013); AIPLA, http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/qj/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
 
43 See, e.g., Journal of College and University Law, UNIV. NOTRE DAME 
http://www3.nd.edu/~jcul/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
 
44 See, e.g., J.L. TECH & POL’Y, http://www.illinoisjltp.com/journal/ (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013); J. PHIL. SCI. & L., http://www.jpsl.org (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
 
45 See LEXISNEXIS, 2005 DIRECTORY OF LAW REVIEWS vii (Michael H. Hoffheimer 
comp., 2004) (listing American law schools’ law reviews).  See generally Law Journals: 
Submissions and Ranking, 2005-2012, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L. LIBR., 
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (choose journals published 
in the “US”; narrow to “student-edited” journals).  
 
46 One such example is the Compact for Open-Access Publishing Equity, committing its 
signatories to underwrite the costs associated with “author-pays” models of open access 
scholarly publishing.  Compact for Open-Access Publishing Equity, OACOMPACT.ORG, 
http://www.oacompact.org/compact/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).  Using this method of 
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policies to promote faculty contributions to open repositories or journals.47  
 
[13] Critics suggest that an open-access publishing model is unrealistic, 
ignores vital market factors, and is premised on a deficient understanding 
of business. 48   Because open-access publishing methods are largely 
untested, do not enjoy the same readership, and have not as yet developed 
a financially viable model, these same critics caution that authors and 
publishers should be wary of open access publishing—after all, someone 
must pay the costs associated with publishing scholarship. 49   These                                                                                                                                           
open-access publishing, the costs associated with publication are often paid by the author 
or the institution with which the author is affiliated.  See, e.g., Berkeley Research Impact 
Initiative: Advancing the Impact of UC Berkeley Research, U.C. BERKELEY LIBR., 
http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/brii/ (last updated Apr. 24, 2013); JH Libraries Open Access 
Promotion Fund, JOHNS HOPKINS SHERIDAN LIBR., 
http://guides.library.jhu.edu/content.php?pid=315747&sid=2802982 (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013). 
 
47 Universities that have instituted such policies include Cambridge neighbors, Harvard 
University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  See MIT Faculty Open Access 
Policy, SCHOLARLY PUBL’G MIT LIBR., http://libraries.mit.edu/scholarly/mit-open-
access/open-access-at-mit/mit-open-access-policy/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013); Open 
Access Policies, HARV. U. LIBR., http://osc.hul.harvard.edu/policies (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013). 
 
48 See Litman, supra note 40, at 780 (“Nobody, [critics] insist, has yet demonstrated that 
open access publishing can generate profits, or even support a nonprofit periodical as a 
going concern.”); see also David Tempest, Open Access: Developing New Publishing 
Models, Editor’s Update, ELSEVIER (Mar. 18, 2012), 
http://editorsupdate.elsevier.com/issue-35-march-2012/a-focus-on-open-access-
development-of-new-publishing-models/ (“Blind adherence to open-access idealism is 
untenable from an economic perspective, even with an all-digital publishing model.”). 
 
49 See Litman, supra note 40, at 782-83; see also Memorandum on Creative Commons 
Licenses, ASS’N LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE INTERNATIONALE (Jan. 22, 2006),  
http://www.alai-usa.org/recent_developments.htm (follow “Memorandum from ALAI” 
hyperlink) (“Caveat auctor!  Let the author beware before she chooses!  A [Creative 
Commons] license may be appropriate and desirable for some authors, particularly 
academics, but, given the dangers the license poses to authors’ prospects for control over 
and compensation for their works, the decision to license should be made with a full 
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arguments, however, are considerably less convincing in their application 
to legal scholarship. 
 
[14] Legal scholarship presents the most straightforward case for open-
access publishing because of its unique independence from market factors 
and reduced reliance on the commercial publishers relative to its peer 
academic disciplines.50  The cost of publishing legal scholarship in law 
journals is substantially underwritten by the universities with which the 
law schools are associated, “to an extent that dwarfs both the mailing and 
printing costs that make up law journals’ chief budgeted expenditures and 
the subscription and royalty payments that account for their chief budgeted 
revenues.”51  Furthermore, the majority of American law journals rely on 
unpaid law students to select and edit legal scholarship, and no one 
participating in the law journal publishing process—from research, writing, 
selecting, editing, and publication—does so because of copyright 
incentives. 52   Perhaps the investment of the law students and their 
institutions in the production and dissemination of legal scholarship 
through their law journals—possibly even the very purpose of legal 
academe—is enhanced by open access publishing.53 
                                                                                                                                           
appreciation of the possible consequences.”). 
 
50 See Dan Hunter, Walled Gardens, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 623-24 (2005).  That 
being the case, in law schools around the country the tide is only now finally turning so 
that electronic sources are more widely accepted in legal writing.  See Ellie Margolis, It’s 
Time to Embrace the New—Untangling the Uses of Electronic Sources in Legal Writing, 
23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 191, 191-93 (2013). 
 
51 Litman, supra note 40, at 783. 
 
52 Id. (“[C]opyright is sufficiently irrelevant that legal scholars, the institutions that 
employ them, and the journals that publish their research tolerate considerable 
uncertainty about who owns the copyright to the works in question, without engaging in 
serious efforts to resolve it.”). 
 
53 See id. 
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III. THE MISALIGNED INCENTIVE SCHEME IN ACADEMIC SCHOLARSHIP 
 
[15] Incentives to encourage academic scholarship in legal academe 
vary slightly from other disciplines.  However, across all disciples, the 
majority of publishers of academic scholarship charge expensive 
subscription fees and limit access by conditioning publication on the 
scholar’s transfer of copyright interests. 54   Scholars’ willingness to 
transfer their copyright interests to publishers is the product of a system 
that lacks sufficient incentives for the scholars.55  In academia, the credo 
is, and may always be, “publish or perish;” a faculty member’s growing 
curriculum vitae and publication record is often the measure of his or her 
professional performance.56                                                         
54 Centivany, supra note 37, at 387; see, e.g., Retain Certain Copyrights, U. CAL., 
http://osc.universityofcalifornia.edu/manage/retain_copyrights.html (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013) (“Traditionally[,] . . . publishers require the transfer of the entire bundle of rights as 
a condition of publication.”).  As described above, some universities encourage open-
access publishing with explicit policies; however, these policies often waive the 
requirement to the extent that it conflicts with the terms of a publisher’s copyright 
transfer agreement.  See, e.g., Open Access Policy Guidelines, HARV. U. LIBR., 
http://osc.hul.harvard.edu/authors/policy_guide (last visited Nov. 8, 2013); Request a 
Waiver, HARV. U. LIBR., http://osc.hul.harvard.edu/authors/waiver (last visited Nov. 8, 
2013). 
 
55 See Centivany, supra note 37, at 387-88. 
 
56 Ushma S. Neill, Publish or Perish, But at What Cost?, 118 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 
2368 (2008); see, e.g., DIANE HARLEY ET AL., ASSESSING THE FUTURE LANDSCAPE OF 
SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION: AN EXPLORATION OF FACULTY VALUES AND NEEDS IN 
SEVEN DISCIPLINES ii (2010), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0kr8s78v.pdf 
(“Advancement in research universities is often described as a ‘three-legged stool,’ with a 
‘research’ leg that is far more important than the ‘teaching’ or ‘service’ legs. . . . The 
advice given to pre-tenure scholars was consistent across all fields: focus on publishing in 
the right venues and avoid spending too much time on public engagement, committee 
work, writing op-ed pieces, developing websites, blogging, and other non-traditional 
forms of electronic dissemination (including online course activities).”).  But cf. Jennifer 
Howard, Rise of ‘Altmetrics’ Revives Questions About How to Measure Impact of 
Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 7, 2013, at A6 (“Adding altmetrics [a 
portmanteau of ‘alternative metrics’] to CVs and dossiers may not be common yet. But 
interest in altmetrics is growing fast, as scholars begin to realize that it’s possible to track 
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[16] Not only is a large quantity of scholarship publication an important 
proxy for a successful career as an academic, universities also incentivize 
scholars to publish in the most prestigious journals.57  The problem is a 
vicious cycle: the perceived reputation of the publication enables its 
publisher to require scholars to transfer their copyright interests to the 
publisher, and the publisher’s ownership of these interests, in turn, enables 
the publisher to restrict access and charge expensive fees.58  While duly 
according the importance of publication reputation, the current incentive 
scheme that is effectively stripping important copyrights from scholars 
represents a departure from the recognition of important cultural, social, 
and institutional dimensions of faculty-produced scholarship.59 
 
[17] When the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to 
discuss what would become the Copyright Clause, it decided against the 
Hegelian option written by Charles Pinckney in favor of a clause 
combining proposals from both Pinckney and James Madison, which is 
now enshrined in Article I of our Constitution.60  The Copyright Clause 
reads: “The Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of                                                                                                                                           
and share evidence of online impact, and publishers and new start-up companies rush to 
develop altmetric services to help them document that impact.”); Jennifer Howard, New 
Metrics Providers Help Keep Libraries in the Research-Tracking Game, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., June 7, 2013, at A6 (“As access to scholarly content online gets easier, librarians 
feel more pressure to be ‘central to the research process again,’ and altmetrics can help . . 
. .”). 
 
57 See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 56. 
 
58 Centivany, supra note 37, at 387-88; see also Jake New, Journal’s Editors Resign, 
Citing ‘Restrictive’ Authors Policy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 5, 2013, at A22 (“The 
editor and the entire editorial board of the Journal of Library Administration have 
resigned in response to a conflict with the journal’s publisher over an author agreement 
that they say is ‘too restrictive and out of step with the expectations of authors.’”). 
 
59 Centivany, supra note 37, at 388 n.13 (“[S]ignificant changes to scholarly publishing 
will require more than a revised understanding of copyright law.”). 
 
60 See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 22-25 (1994). 
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Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” 61  The plain language of the Clause’s prefatory language 
reveals the drafters’ aspirational intent: scholarship and invention were 
meant to educate and benefit the citizens of the new republic.  
Recalibrating the measure of professional performance in academe in 
favor of incentivizing relevant, accessible publication that promotes the 
goodwill of the university, regardless of the source of publication, may 
retract the problem of self-reinforcing incentives and realign the creation 
of scholarship with our nation’s founding copyright principles. 
 
A.  Legal Treatment of Ownership Interests in Scholarship 
 
[18] Ownership of the copyright interests in scholarship is somewhat 
ambiguous and is the subject of considerable debate. 62  Under federal 
statute, a copyright in a work attaches first to the author of the work.63  
Accordingly, the long-standing tradition of the academy affords scholars 
most, if not all, the copyright interests in their work. 64  However, the 
practical application of university copyright policies circumvents the 
traditional rule.65  In fact, for the most part, universities claim ownership 
                                                        
61 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 
62 Faculty scholarship practices are far more varied and abstruse than this article (or its 
traditional treatment by copyright law regimes) allows.  See id. 
 
63 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006); cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
737 (1989) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102) (“As a general rule, the author is the party who 
actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible 
expression entitled to copyright protection.”); Centivany, supra note 37, at 389 
(“Determining authorship is typically not difficult because, in most cases, the person who 
creates the work is also considered the author for purposes of copyright ownership.”). 
 
64 See Centivany, supra note 37, at 389. 
 
65 Note that prior to 1976, a common law “teacher exception” existed to exempt teachers 
from the operation of the works for hire doctrine; however, Congress failed to codify the 
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in the copyright interests of works created by their faculty under the 
“works made for hire” exception.66  Under the Copyright Act, absent a 
written and signed instrument in which the parties have expressly agreed 
otherwise, works made for hire are considered to be the property of the 
employer or person for whom the work was prepared, for purposes of 
copyright.67  The statutory hook of works made for hire contemplates the 
following arrangements: (1) works prepared by an employee in the scope 
of his or her employment, or (2) works specially ordered under one of nine 
statutory classifications68 where the parties have also expressly agreed in a 
signed writing that the work is made for hire.69 
 
[19] Few, if any, faculty works are specially ordered or subject to a 
signed agreement between university and faculty member categorizing                                                                                                                                           
exception in the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act, extinguishing the exception 
provided by the common law rule.  Id. at 388-89. 
 
66 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).  This statute codifies a principle first recognized by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.  See 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903); CRAIG JOYCE ET 
AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 272 (8th ed. 2010); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 
U.S. at 737 (“Classifying a work as ‘made for hire’ determines not only the initial 
ownership of its copyright, but also the copyright’s duration, § 302(c), and the owners’ 
renewal rights, §304(a), termination rights, § 203(a), and right to import certain goods 
bearing the copyright, § 601(b)(1).”); Centivany, supra note 37, at 389. 
 
67 This rule is particularly well acknowledged throughout federal court jurisprudence over 
the last one hundred twenty-five years.  See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 
737.  See generally Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248; Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896); 
Colliery Eng’r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch. Co., 94 F. 152, 153 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1899); Carte v. Evans, 27 F. 861 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886) . 
 
68 These include works made for use as a contribution to “a collective work, as a part of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a 
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an 
atlas.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 
69 Id.; see also Centivany, supra note 37, at 389. 
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scholarship as a work made for hire; in fact, such an arrangement would 
be both inefficient and burdensome. Judicial guidance responsive to the 
question of whether faculty-created works are considered to be “prepared 
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment”70 has been 
relatively scarce, but does provide some, albeit complicating, direction.71 
In considering this issue with regard to copyright interests, the Supreme 
Court’s multi-factored test in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid72 represents the standard for resolving the question of whether an                                                         
70 The Restatement of Agency explicitly contemplates the employment relationship as 
well.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) with RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2)-(3) (2006). 
 
71 In one such case, in which the district court attempted to establish clarity regarding the 
issue, the legatee of a dancer—who had also been the “employee” of her eponymous 
dance school—sought to prove the dancer’s copyright interest in dances she helped create.  
Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary 
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, however, had other ideas.  See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. 
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 647 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(affirming in part, reversing in part and vacating in part the decision—and the settling of 
the rule to the extent it existed—in the lower court).  Having said that, the Second Circuit 
did preserve an important element of works made for hire jurisprudence, concluding that 
Graham, the dancer, individually owned the dances she created during the first ten years 
of her employment, because she worked only “one-third of her professional time” and 
choreography was not within the scope of her employment responsibilities as Program 
Director.  Id. at 637-38.  However, when Graham signed a new employment contract with 
the Center, doing so “altered both the nature and extent of her employment from part-
time dance instructor to full-time choreographer,” and thus the dances she created during 
this period of her employment belonged to the Center as works made for hire.  Id. at 639-
41. 
 
72 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751-53.  For a concise recitation of 
the facts of the case, see Centivany, supra note 37, at 390-91. 
In that case, a non-profit organization, the Community for Creative 
Non-Violence (CCNV), hired James Earl Reid, to create a sculpture 
dramatizing the plight of the homeless . . . . CCNV provided Reid with 
a concept and a fairly detailed description of what they wanted, and 
after negotiating price and cost of materials, Reid created the 
sculpture. . . . [When] CCNV planned to take the statue on a tour of 
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employment relationship exists.73  
 
[20] The factors to be considered are: (1) the hiring party's right to 
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished; (2) 
the skill required; (3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools; (4) the 
location of the work; (5) the duration of the relationship between the 
parties; (6) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hired party's discretion 
over when and how long to work; (8) the method of payment; (9) the hired 
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; (10) whether the work is part 
of the regular business of the hiring party; (11) whether the hiring party is 
in business; (12) the provision of employee benefits; and (13) the tax 
treatment of the hired party.74 Sealed with ambiguity, the true hallmark of 
a balancing test handed down from on high, the Court’s decision 
specifically noted that “[n]o one of these factors is determinative,” and 
that “the extent of control the hiring party exercises over the details of the 
product is not dispositive.”75 While this balancing test only reveals the fact                                                                                                                                           
several cities to raise money for the homeless[,] Reid objected, arguing 
that the material the statue was cast in rendered it too weak to withstand 
CCNV’s ambitious itinerary. . . . Reid [then] refused to return the 
sculpture to CCNV, registered copyright for the sculpture in his name, 
and planned a more modest tour of his own. CCNV then sued to 
establish copyright ownership in the sculpture.  
The central issue before the court was whether the sculpture was a 
work-for-hire.  
Id.  Using the multi-factor test, the Court held that Reid was an independent contractor 
and not an employee of CCNV.  Id. at 391-92. 
 
73 In proposing its balancing test, the Court retreated from the “control test,” specifically 
holding that "employee" should not be interpreted exclusively in terms of whether the 
hiring party retains the right to control the product, nor in terms of whether the hiring 
party has actually exercised control over the creation of the work.  See Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 742-43. 
 
74 Id. at 751-52. 
 
75 Id. at 752. 
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that copyright interests are not decisively settled, it does articulate the 
criteria that establishes an employment relationship between faculty 
members and their employer institutions, as well as the ownership of 
copyright interests in faculty-created works. 
 
B.  The Application of Copyright Interests in the Modern 
Academic Employment Relationship 
 
[21] Applying the trappings of copyright law as articulated through 
statutes and case law discussed above, faculty members are almost 
certainly employees—as opposed to independent contractors—for 
purposes of the works made for hire doctrine. Universities tend to hire 
faculty members who hold terminal degrees and are thus expected to 
possess refined knowledge and skill in their field; however, a faculty 
member’s level of skill is distinguishable from that of a project-oriented, 
independent contractor.76 Furthermore, the fact that a university chooses 
not to wield control over the manner and means of faculty-created works 
does not itself indicate that the university does not possess rights to control 
faculty creations.77 Also, while universities serve a multitude of functions, 
their business is irreducibly that of education and research; thus, faculty-
created works, whether manifested as scholarship, service, or teaching,                                                         
76 See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 592.  A clear 
indicator of the existence of an employment relationship is the fact that universities 
typically pay their employees salaries, as well as offer employee benefits, and withhold 
taxes, whereas such an arrangement is uncommon in a hiring party’s relationship with an 
independent contractor.  Centivany, supra note 37, at 396.  In addition, the  
duration of the relationship between a university and its faculty is 
typically for one or more academic years with the possibility of 
renewal, rather than being limited to a short period of time or to a 
project with a clearly defined scope, as is generally the case with an 
independent contractor. 
Id. at 397. In the case of tenured faculty, renewal is the presumption.  Id. at 397 n.77. 
 
77 Centivany, supra note 37 at 396; see Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc., 224 
F. Supp. 2d at 592. 
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form an essential part of universities’ regular activities.78 
 
[22] Despite this seemingly clear relationship, not every court has 
characterized the association between a university and faculty member in 
the same light for purposes of copyright law. Such cases predate the 
Community for Creative Non-Violence decision, the new authoritative 
precedent on the issue, but do also cite academic tradition and the fact that 
scholarship is the result of highly-skilled expertise and creativity as 
support for deciding that such faculty-created works should fall outside the 
scope of employment.79 Certainly this position has its merits; however, 
unlike common law traditions, which occasionally become codified as the 
law of the land, academic traditions are nonbinding. 
 
[23] Finally, a faculty member’s motivations for creating a work should 
have little bearing on this analysis. The jurisprudence in this area only 
requires that the work be actuated, in some part, by a purpose to serve the                                                         
78 Centivany, supra note 37, at 397. 
As part of their employment responsibilities, university faculty are 
generally expected to carry out duties consisting of some combination 
of teaching students, conducting research, and partaking in various 
service-orientated tasks.  Works of authorship resulting from these 
activities, including scholarly books and articles, course materials, and 
departmental committee reports, are of the kind faculty are employed to 
perform and thus will typically fall within the scope of employment.  
Id. at 399. 
 
79 See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Although [faculty 
members produce scholarship] as part of their employment responsibilities . . . the . . . 
assumption . . . was that  . . . the right to copyright such writing belonged to the [faculty 
member] rather than to the . . . university.”), abrogated by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 
1987) (“[A] professor . . . who proves a new theorem in the course of his employment 
will own the copyright to his article containing the proof.  This has been the academic 
tradition since copyright law began.”); see also Centivany, supra note 37, at 399.  It must 
be noted that Community for Creative Non-Violence arguably rejects the assumptions 
taken by the Seventh Circuit in these cases. 
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university—a very low threshold to cross. 80 Self-motivation to create a 
work is not dispositive of whether the work was undertaken to serve, at 
least in part, the interests of the employer.81 Unless a work is made “with 
no intention to [create the work] as a part of or incident to” employment as 
a university faculty member, 82  the work falls within the scope of 
employment. 83   Thus, nearly all faculty-created works are: (1) made 
within the scope of employment; (2) of a nature for which faculty are 
employed to perform; and (3) actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to 
serve the university. 84   There exists a strong, nearly irrefutable                                                         
80 See Centivany, supra note 37, at 400-01. 
[T]he extent to which a faculty work is actuated by a purpose to serve 
the university depends to some degree on the category of work in 
question and the intent of the particular faculty member. Some faculty 
members may create works that are fully actuated by a purpose to serve 
the university and would not have created the works but for their 
employment obligation. However, many faculty members may be 
internally motivated to conduct research, teach, or participate in 
service-related activities; they may even feel that they would create 
works associated with these activities regardless of whether it was their 
job to do so. 
Id. 
 
81 See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc., 389 F.3d at 640 (“Graham was a self-
motivator, and perhaps she would have choreographed her dances without the salary of 
Artistic Director, without the Center’s support and encouragement, and without the 
existence of the Center at all, but all that is beside the point.  The fact is that the Center 
did employ her to do the work, and she did the work in the course of her regular 
employment with the Center.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236 (1958) 
(“Conduct may be within the scope of employment, although done in part to serve the 
purposes of the servant or of a third person.”). 
 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1958).  “An act . . . is not within the scope 
of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a 
service on account of which [the employee] is employed.”  Id. 
 
83 Centivany, supra note 37, at 401. 
 
84 Id. at 398 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)). 
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presumption, then, that faculty members are employees of the university 
for copyright purposes under the works made for hire doctrine; therefore, 
copyright in faculty-created works vests initially in the university.85 
 
IV.  CONCERNS, BENEFITS, AND APPLICATIONS OF UNIVERSITY 
COPYRIGHT INTERESTS IN FACULTY-PRODUCED SCHOLARSHIP 
 
A.  Addressing the Concern That the “Monopoly” of 
University Copyright Interests in Scholarship Is a Fetter to 
Faculty Creativity and the Educational Function of the 
University 
 
[24] From academe’s inception, its uniquely creative environment has 
been its defining feature. Critics argue that a university’s exercise of 
copyright ownership over faculty-created works undermines faculty 
innovation by drastically altering this environment.86  Further, opponents 
of vesting the copyright interests of faculty-created work in the university                                                         
85 Id. at 401. 
  
86 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 591-92 (1987).  In her article, Professor Dreyfuss expresses a 
concern that the works made for hire doctrine hampers employee creativity, especially 
among university faculty, because of the 1976 Act’s elimination of the teacher exception.  
Id.; cf. Centivany, supra note 37, at 407-08 (discussing how universities own the 
copyrights in faculty-created works under the works made for hire doctrine and that 
policies purporting to transfer these rights, either back to the faculty member or a third 
party, are unlikely to meet the signed writing requirement under Section 204 of the 1976 
Copyright Act).  But see SPARC, AUTHOR RIGHTS: USING THE SPARC AUTHOR 
ADDENDUM TO SECURE YOUR RIGHTS AS THE AUTHOR OF A JOURNAL ARTICLE (2006). 
http://www.sparc.arl.org/sites/default/files/SPARC_AuthorRights2006_0.pdf.  “As the 
author of a work you are the copyright holder unless and until you transfer the copyright 
to someone else in a signed agreement” (original emphasis removed).  Id. at 3.  However, 
the ability of a university policy to establish a default position that the university owns all 
copyright rights in faculty created work is insufficient to meet the signed writing 
requirement, and this finding has been consistently applied by courts.  See, e.g., Foraste v. 
Brown Univ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D.R.I. 2003); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, The 
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1926 (2007). 
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argue that universities should not enforce ownership over these copyright 
interests at the risk of degrading long-held academic principles and 
traditions.87  Additionally, there are those with concerns that, in practice, 
the pecuniary interests of the institution will supplant the non-pecuniary 
motivations of the faculty member. 88   However, the current copyright 
regime’s treatment of ownership interests in the copyright of scholarship 
has neither stunted faculty creativity nor encumbered the production of 
scholarship. These concerns, while valid, have yet to come to fruition 
since the Copyright Act was revised in 1976 and construed to vest 
copyright interests in universities in their faculty-created scholarship.89 
 
[25] To date, attempts have been unsuccessful to circumvent the default 
position that the works made for hire doctrine applies to scholarship 
produced by faculty member employees of a university because they fail 
to satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Act.90  Though the failure of 
such policies may negatively impact the proprietary scholarly publishing 
industry, such detrimental impact on this industry also remains to be 
seen.91  It is worth noting that, despite these ownership rights vesting first                                                         
87 Dreyfuss, supra note 86, at 638 (“In exchange for a modest chance of pecuniary gain, 
the university risks fundamental alterations in the environment it creates for its student 
body and professional staff.”). 
 
88 Id. at 590-91. 
 
89 See Centivany, supra note 37, at 409-13 (analyzing Professor Dreyfuss’ concerns in 
light of over two decades of experiences and discussing the implications for the scholarly 
publishing industry as a whole).  “Due to its express policies, the university may be 
estopped from subsequently attempting to enforce its copyrights against the faculty-
creator.” Id. at 411; see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 13.07(A) (2013).  A university has a duty to act in agreement with the 
terms of the contracts between it and its faculty.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 
8.13 (2006).  To contravene this duty would be a serious blunder, not just legally, but 
perhaps more damningly, for brand and public relations of the university. 
 
90 See Centivany, supra note 37 at 408. 
 
91 See id. at 412-13. 
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in the university, in practice universities rarely enforce them as against 
their faculty members; to do so could diminish what is perhaps a 
university’s greatest asset—its goodwill.92  A university, not unlike other 
collective groups, is the sum of its parts. Thus, in place of exercising 
ownership rights in scholarship to the exclusion of its faculty member 
creator, it is in the best interest of the university, in fulfilling its 
educational function, to support the public’s interest in open access to 
scholarly works.93 
 
B.  The Implications of Open Access to Legal Scholarship 
 
[26] Believe it or not, the seeds of change—from purely proprietary 
publishing to open-access publishing—have been sown at the very top of 
legal academe for over five years.  In 2008, the Harvard Law School 
faculty voted to offer their scholarship “freely available in an online 
repository.”94  Later that year, the directors of the law libraries at eleven of                                                         
92 Cf. id. at 401 (noting that “while copyright initially vests in universities under work-
for-hire, university policies effectively transfer those rights to the faculty-creators” 
(emphasis added)). 
 
93 See, e.g., Jennifer Howard, Open Access Gains Major Support in U. of California’s 
Systemwide Move, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Open-Access-Gains-Major/140851/. 
[T]he University of California’s Academic Senate has adopted an open-
access policy that will make research articles freely available to the 
public through eSchoalrship, California’s open digital repository. . . . 
More than 175 universities have preceded California in endorsing open 
access, but the huge research footprint of the California system gives its 
action extra significance. . . . The new mandate ‘signals to scholarly 
publishers that open access, in terms defined by faculty and not by 
publishers, must be part of any future scholarly-publishing system,’ the 
statement says. 
Id.  
 
94 Harvard Law Votes Yes on Open Access, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (May 
7, 2008), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/4273. 
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the most elite law schools met at Duke Law School to draft what became 
the Durham Statement on Open Access to Legal Scholarship.95  Ushering 
in the open access era, the Durham Statement called for all law schools to 
move toward electronic publication of scholarship, to commit to making 
available and storing electronic versions of scholarship in stable, open, 
digital formats, and, eventually, to stop publishing journals. 96   The 
principal argument for a movement toward open access in legal academe 
is an easy case to make: in addition to the philosophical principles 
advanced by open access, on a practical level it supports a vital 
professional goal of the faculty members by maximizing the impact of 
their work.97  After all, what attorney does not appreciate recognition in 
his or her field?  Not surprisingly, “[f]ew commentators have objected to 
the Durham Statement’s call for open access publication of law 
journals.”98 
 
[27] Apart from these elite schools, however, few schools have 
followed suit and very few United States law reviews are registered with 
                                                        
95 The universities represented were: the University of Chicago, Columbia University, 
Cornell University, Duke University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, New 
York University, Northwestern University, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford 
University, the University of Texas, and Yale University.  Perhaps an homage to the 
Declaration of Independence, the Durham Statement stored on Harvard University’s 
Berkman Center for Internet and Society website a list of signatories.  Durham Statement 
on Open Access to Legal Scholarship, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/durhamstatement (last updated Feb. 1, 2012). 
 
96 Id.; see Danner et al., supra note 33, at 40 (noting that the Durham Statement calls for 
open access publication and an end to print publication of law journals); Donovan & 
Watson, supra note 32, at 554 (discussing the aims of the Durham Statement). 
 
97 Donovan & Watson, supra note 33, at 560. 
 
98 Danner et al., supra note 33, at 40.  This may be because the biggest impact of the 
Durham Statement manifests itself as organizing principle for the future of its signatory 
law libraries.  See id.  
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the Directory of Open Access Journals. 99  That being said, a growing 
number of schools post some scholarship content on their publicly-
accessible journal websites, despite the risks of reducing revenue from 
print subscriptions and royalty income from proprietary online 
aggregators.100  This small gesture may expose legal academe’s less than 
ostensible belief that scholarship fulfills a public good.101 
  
[28] While this Article recognizes the strong policy considerations for 
applying open-access principles to legal scholarship, the discussion should 
also be approached from an economic perspective. Perhaps legal academe 
has tarried in adopting open access publishing because of the absence of 
any demand to explore low-cost alternatives to the traditional subscription 
model.102  Legal scholarship publishing costs are modest when compared 
with scholarly publishing in other academic disciplines.103  “Law journal 
subscription prices are low, and have risen at less than the rate of inflation 
for a generation.” 104   At the same time, law faculty members enjoy 
virtually free access to electronic versions of published law review articles                                                         
99 See DOAJ Members, DIRECTORY OPEN ACCESS J., 
http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=loadTempl&templ=members&uiLanguage=en (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2013) (listing only twenty-four libraries, universities, and research centers 
in the United States that are registered with the Directory).  
 
100 See Danner et al., supra note 33, at 41.  
 
101 See id. (quoting Richard Edwards & David Shulenburger, The High Cost of Scholarly 
Journals (And What to Do About It), CHANGE, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 10, 13.  Danner et al. 
go on to posit that “in the age of the Internet, a commitment to research and scholarship 
carries with it a responsibility to circulate one’s work as widely as possible.”  Id. (citing 
JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE xii (2005)).  
 
102 See Litman, supra note 40, at 791.  
 
103 See Paul George et al., The Future Gate to Scholarly Legal Information, AALL 
SPECTRUM, Apr. 2005, at 1,1, available at 
http://www.aallnet.org/products/pub_sp0504/pub_sp0504_MB.pdf. 
 
104 Litman, supra note 40, at 791. 
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through proprietary outlets, such as HeinOnline, Lexis, and Westlaw, all 
of which require subscriptions.105  The driving force for open access in 
legal publishing comes almost entirely from the perspective of supplying 
scholarship: law school faculty members who want to increase readership 
of their research outside of legal academe cannot reach this audience 
through HeinOnline, Lexis, and Westlaw. 106   The latter two resources 
have made vast fortunes from material that is mostly in the public domain, 
by making it available subject to useful search functionality, but are 
expensive and  functionally irrelevant to academics outside legal 
academe. 107  While these powerful search tools are not without value, 
reliance on them diminishes when law journals and their parent 
institutions develop resources to publicly access and archive legal 
scholarship—an idea with the potential to transform legal scholarship as it 
currently exists.108 
 
V. A RECOMMENDATION FOR ENSURING OPEN ACCESS TO LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 
 
[29] Universities, the holders of copyright in academic scholarship, are 
uniquely situated to achieve their public, educational function, as well as 
to reduce reliance on the proprietary scholarly publishing industry, and 
empower faculty while promoting open access.109  In legal academe, many 
universities already underwrite the cost of submitting scholarship for                                                         
105 Id.  It should be noted that legal research and scholarship require access not only to 
other legal scholarship, but also to primary sources of law; thus, “open access to legal 
scholarship must be discussed within the context of electronic access to other types of 
legal information.”  Danner et al., supra note 33, at 41. 
 
106 See Litman, supra note 40, at 791.  
 
107 See id. at 792.  
 
108 See id. at 792-93.  
 
109 See Centivany, supra note 37, at 388-89. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1  
 
32 
publication and should extend their support one small step further by 
providing faculty with financial assistance to cover the associated costs of 
publication in open-access journals and repositories. 110  Given that many 
universities, particularly research universities, are the recipients of federal 
funds derived from public tax dollars, it is in the universities’ best interest 
to reinvest some portion of these funds in relevant and publicly accessible 
scholarship to benefit not only the profession but also local, regional, and 
national communities.111 
 
[30] With these changes, academe should prioritize the development of 
a viable alternative method of peer review.112  Internally, universities must 
shift the focus of the existing academic incentive system, and its reliance 
on the proprietary publishing industry, to examine the ways in which 
faculty accumulate goodwill for employer institutions. 113  Open-access 
journals, open educational resources, and open archival repositories serve 
the important interests of the public that are often ignored in the context of 
the debate over copyright interest in academic scholarship. 114   The 
language of the Copyright Clause could not be clearer in stating that 
creation of copyrightable works inures to the benefit of the public. 115                                                         
110 Litman, supra note 40, at 793; see Centivany, supra note 37, at 414. 
 
111 See Memorandum from the John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 1-3, 5, 6; George et al., 
supra note 103, at 2.  
 
112 With the advent of altmetrics, digital media is increasing a feasible source of 
disseminating knowledge.  Thus, the process for peer and tenure review to reflect this 
modern reality may already be underway.  See Howard, supra note 5, at A6; see also 
Leonard Cassuto, The Rise of the Mini-Monograph, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 16, 
2013, at A31 (“Fewer advisers now imagine their graduate students’ dissertations 
necessarily as books in the making.  While the book still remains the absolute standard in 
many departments, the group that thinks that way is getting smaller.”). 
 
113 See Centivany, supra note 37, at 386, 413. 
 
114 See Donovan & Watson, supra note 33, at 558-59. 
 
115  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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Academe’s support of open-access resources is essential; however, it is 
not necessary for academe to completely emancipate itself from 
proprietary publishers, many of whom serve an important role in the 
profession and possess their own stakeholder interests in copyright.116   
 
[31] The reality is that proprietary scholarly publishers currently exert a 
disproportionate amount of control over scholarly works.117  Perhaps the 
best elements of existing solutions proffer the best foundation for the 
application of open access to scholarly publication. The temporal solution 
put forth by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
appears to handle the interests of each stakeholder—the scholar, the 
institution, the publisher, and the public—most fairly.118  The open-access 
repository of faculty scholarship chartered by Harvard presents the ideal 
access portal and archive of publicly accessible scholarship.119   Finally, 
when compared with individual faculty members, universities have a 
substantially stronger bargaining position to help reclaim the broad 
copyright interests that scholars transfer to their publishers as of right. 120                                                          
 
116 See Litman, supra note 40, at 781-82.  In fact, the original copyright protection, the 
Statute of Anne, was designed to protect the interests of publishers. Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp. 
 
117 See Litman, supra note 40, at 784; see also Mridu Khullar Relph, In India, Academics 
Defend Photocopying of Textbooks for Course Packs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 15, 
2013, at A15 (chronicling the legal battle by the world’s three largest academic 
publishers—Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and Taylor & 
Francis—with the University of Delhi and Rameshwari Photocopying Services over the 
photocopying of short excerpts of books to create curricular course packs for use in 
university classrooms).  See generally Centivany, supra note 37 (discussing, in greater 
detail, the extent of the control exercised by publishers in the publication of academic 
scholarship in America.) 
 
118  See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
 
119  See Centivany, supra note 37, at 387 (citing Open Access Policies, supra note 47). 
 
120 See id. at 401. 
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By exercising ownership of copyright interests in scholarship, universities 
have the ability to profoundly influence the relevancy and public access of 
academic scholarship, promoting both the constitutional invocation of the 
Copyright Clause and the primary public function of the university—
education.     
                                                                                                                                          
 
